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Abstract: In this paper we use a case study of the Rhine River to examine the 
relevance of Common Pool Resource (CPR) Theory for two conditions in which 
it has not been extensively tested: large scale international water management and 
pollution problems. For that purpose, we link variation in pollution abatement to a 
set of explanatory variables proposed by CPR theory. Causal inference is established 
through process tracing and a series of within-case comparison across actor groups 
(i.e. riparian nations, industry, and agriculture), resource types (i.e. point source, and 
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non-point source pollutants), and time periods (1976–1986, when treaties provided 
a limited basis for collective action and pollution abatement, and 1987–2001, when 
the Rhine Action Plan proved more successful). According to our analysis, a number 
of CPR variables can help understanding cooperation for pollution abatement in the 
Rhine case. These include physical attributes such as clear hydrological boundaries; 
governance factors such as the articulation of monitoring and decision-making at 
different governance levels and the proportional allocation of costs and benefits of 
abating pollution; and actor factors like the small size, trust and homogeneity of 
some actor groups and leadership. Other variables proposed by CPR theory proved 
to be irrelevant or in need of qualification. These include the right to self-organize 
and to participate in decision-making, communication and resource-dependence. 
Finally, two variables, not emphasized by CPR theory, proved relevant: the 
occurrence of external disturbances and the role of interest groups. We conclude 
that CPR theory is valuable for explaining pollution management in large trans-
boundary river basins, but requires qualification and extension.
Keywords: Common-Pool Resource theory; pollution; Rhine; SESMAD; trans-
boundary watershed
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1. Introduction
In this paper we present a case study of water governance in the Rhine River 
in order to examine the relevance of Common Pool Resource (CPR) theory for 
two contexts where the theory has not been extensively tested before: large scale 
trans-boundary water management and water pollution.
Applications of CPR theory to the study of water governance have traditionally 
focused on identifying the conditions under which individuals are able to cooperate 
at the local level. In this vein, CPR theory has traditionally understood cooperation 
as fundamentally mediated by the ability of relatively small and homogeneous 
communities of users to communicate frequently and design appropriate rules and 
norms of behavior (Agrawal 2001). Large, trans-boundary systems differ from 
that ideal scenario in a number of ways. Such systems involve a huge number and 
diversity of stakeholders, are too large for coordination through frequent interactions, 
and tend to lack the sort of pre-existing political and social institutions relied on at 
smaller scales. In this paper we explore the extent to which these differences hinder 
Conceptualizing resource and institutional dynamics 363
the applicability of CPR theory. Many rivers also face severe pollution problems that 
require additional exploration (UNEP et al. 2008). In this paper we aim to contribute 
to that understanding by applying CPR theory to the case of the Rhine River.
A number of studies agree on the success of pollution management in the Rhine 
(van Dijk et al. 1995; Bernauer and Moser 1996; Dieperink 2000; Huisman et al. 
2000; Froehlich-Schmitt 2003). At the beginning of the 1960s, water quality in 
the Rhine watershed had reached its poorest state. The lower portions of the river 
contained high concentrations of pollutants such as lead, mercury, cadmium and 
zinc, while a number of fish species like salmon had been completely eliminated 
from the watershed, and the aquatic ecosystem was virtually dead (Nollkaemper 
1996). Until that time, international cooperation on the river had been limited to 
the regulation of shipping and salmon fishing, and more localized agreements 
concerning Lake Constance, and tributaries such as the Saar and Moselle. This 
changed with the creation of the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Rhine (ICPR) in the 1960s and a series of pollution management agreements in the 
1970s and 1980s. Most of the states that cooperated to create the ICPR belonged to 
the European Economic Community, which had been founded only in 1951. Since 
then, pollution regulations issued by the ICPR and the European Union developed 
in parallel. By the mid-1990s, emissions of two-thirds of critical chemicals had 
been reduced by 50%, water quality parameters had improved notably, and salmon 
and other fish stocks were on their way to recovery (ICPR 2012a).
The success of the Rhine case is not absolute. Environmental outcomes 
have improved only over time and the governance system seems to have been 
more effective with regard to point-source than to non-point-source pollutants 
and polluters. Offering a consistent explanation for that variation in performance 
constitutes the main theoretical goal of this paper. Can CPR theory help us to 
understand the relative success of water pollution management in the Rhine 
watershed? And, to what extent can CPR theory be applied to pollution problems in 
similar large, trans-boundary contexts? To answer these questions we characterize 
the Rhine case across a series of governance, actor and biophysical variables.
Our case selection is appropriate as a test for CPR theory for several reasons. 
First, the Rhine is the largest watershed in north-western Europe, covering 170,000 
km2 and a population of about 60 million people across eight different countries. 
Additionally, the historical density of industrial and agricultural activity has been 
among the highest in the world (Stigliani et al. 1993). Second, the long history of 
conflict between the countries of the Rhine basin makes it a particularly unlikely 
case for successful international cooperation. Third, the success of pollution 
management in the Rhine is only partial. Initial successes emerged only in the late 
1970s, after more than a decade of missteps. Moreover, there are still important 
pollution control gaps, particularly with regard to non-point source emissions 
(Froehlich-Schmitt 2003). This within-case variation facilitates the identification 
of factors that contribute to success as well as prevent it. Finally, the case has been 
studied by a large number of scholars which provides us an opportunity to develop 
a thorough comparison of the case with CPR theory by drawing on existing studies.
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2. CPR theory, large scale contexts and pollution problems
The core presumption of CPR theory is that certain environmental problems result 
from collective action problems, in which actors must overcome incentives geared 
at short-term individual gains to achieve socially preferred outcomes (Ostrom 
et al. 1994).
CPR theory distinguishes two types of collective action problems: appropriation 
and provision problems (Ostrom et al. 1994). A provision problem emerges when 
the costs of providing a public good are private while the benefits are shared. 
The difficulty of excluding individuals from using public goods constitutes an 
incentive for individuals not to contribute to their provision. This may result in the 
under-provision of the goods. A common provision problem in the water sector 
is underinvestment in infrastructure such as reservoirs or canals. Appropriation 
problems emerge when benefits from harvesting resource units are private while 
costs are shared. These problems are associated with common pool resources 
(CPRs), which share with public goods the difficulty of excluding users and thus 
the risk of under-provision. In addition, CPRs are depleted when used, which can 
result in negative externalities and over-exploitation if individual demand is high 
enough. The combination of difficult excludability and rivalry in consumption 
constitutes an incentive for individuals not to restrain their harvesting behavior 
even if that would be needed. Over-irrigation by farmers in semi-arid contexts is 
a typical example of a water appropriation problem.
Emitting pollutants can be compared to over-appropriating from a CPR. Like 
in appropriation problems, the benefits of over-emitting polluting substances are 
private to polluters while the costs are shared by a broader population. However, 
appropriating a CPR and emitting a pollutant involve different dynamics. In the 
former case, the collective action problem is related to the use and exhaustibility 
of the CPR (e.g. farmers using water from a river). In the latter case, the collective 
action problem is due to the negative impact of the pollutant (e.g. cadmium) on 
the quantity and/or quality of a related CPR or public good (e.g. salmon stocks 
or drinking water). Thus, in pollution situations, the collective action problem can 
also be understood as a problem of natural resource restoration (i.e. comparable to 
public good provision).1
 Additionally, in pollution contexts the interaction between 
actors and the environmental commons can be particularly distant. Contrary to 
appropriation problems, where all users jointly use (i.e. depend on) a common good, 
in pollution problems, the actors producing the externality may well not depend on 
the affected good, nor even share its use. Chemical firms polluting a river do not 
usually depend on high-quality water for their productive activities, as farmers or 
fishers do. Also importantly, the pollution externality can well be mediated through 
the interactions between environmental commons, like polluted water and aquatic 
species, which is not the case in conventional CPR appropriation problems.
1
 From this point of view, the management challenge is restoring the productivity of the resource 
(i.e. improving the quality of water or increasing fish stocks in the Rhine), which is in essence a 
provision problem.
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A number of scholars have successfully applied CPR theory to understand water 
allocation and infrastructure provision in larger river basins (Blomquist et al. 2004, 
2005; Kerr 2007; Schlager and Blomquist 2008; Heikkila et al. 2011; Schlager and 
Heikkila 2011; Heikkila and Schlager 2012; Yetim 2002). For example, CPR theory 
is applied to US interstate river compacts by Schlager and Blomquist (2008) and 
Heikkila and Schlager (2012) focus on cross-scale institutional linkages to assess 
the performance and climate change adaptability of US interstate river compacts, 
respectively; Yetim (2002) emphasizes the importance of clear property rights and 
enforcement mechanisms to solve International Common Pool Resources disputes; 
Blomquist et al. (2005) and Kerr (2007) identified a number of factors of CPR theory 
related with successful river basin management, including, among others, leadership, 
the recognition of sub-basin authorities and nesting of organizational capacities and 
collective choice across scales. As illustrated by those works, using CPR theory in 
large scale contexts entails a redefinition of concepts like user group and governance 
system, as well as the consideration of phenomena other than collective action problems 
(for example the existence of contentious politics). In this regard, some authors have 
pointed to the lack of interest of applying CPR theory to large scale contexts. Araral 
(2014) acknowledges that the management of local and large commons can be 
confronted by similar appropriation and provision dilemmas, but that the differences 
in scale, transaction costs, and the nature of the actor groups (individuals vs. nation-
states) results in qualitatively different cooperation dynamics. At lager scales “the 
main actors are nation-states represented by a collection of political actors who are 
trying to maximize their constituencies’ self-interests to secure their own political 
survival” (Araral 2014, 9); and this results in wicked interactions not observed at 
local levels. Other differences pointed to by authors include actor’s awareness of 
degradation, power, cultural and institutional homogeneity, feasibility of learning, 
regeneration of degraded resource, ease of understanding resource dynamics and 
stability of resource dynamics (Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Stern 2011).
A number of studies have also applied CPR theory to water pollution problems. 
Some of those studies focus on the collective action problems faced by specific 
user groups to effectively reduce pollution (Lundqvist 2001; Wittgren et al. 2005; 
Amblard 2012). Other studies aim at identifying the factors that motivate polluters 
to reduce emissions or invest in water quality (Lo and Tang 1994; Lundqvist 
2001; Emery and Franks 2012), including trust and reciprocity (Lundqvist 2001), 
the diversification of decision-making authority (Lo and Tang 1994) and common 
understanding and horizons among polluters (Emery and Franks 2012). In this 
study we aim at understanding both phenomena simultaneously.
3. Case background
Since the 19th Century the Rhine (Figure 1) has been intensively used for 
shipping, irrigation, drinking water production, fishing and industrial waste 
disposal, thereby becoming one of the underpinnings of the economy of Western 
Europe. The resulting benefits came with a price. By the beginning of the 20th 
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Century the impact of waste disposal and other forms of pollution on drinking 
water, irrigation and fishing raised a concern about the need to cooperate to 
control emissions.
The history of international cooperation on the Rhine has been extensively 
documented (Dieperink 1998, 2000; Huisman et al. 2000; Bernauer 2002; Mostert 
2009). A summary of major events is provided in Table 1. The earliest international 
cooperation on the Rhine began at the end of the Napoleonic wars, with agreements 
on trade. Concern over overfishing of salmon led to the creation of the Salmon 
Commission in 1885. This Commission, however, did not prevent the construction 
of dams and water works, which had a negative impact on migratory fish species. 
By 1940 salmon stocks were depleted. The Dutch brought the pollution issue to 
the Salmon Commission as early as the 1920s (Huisman et al. 2000). Despite the 
Dutch efforts, steps to create a common pollution information system began only 
Figure 1: Map of the Rhine watershed.
Source: Elaborated from (ICPR 2012d)
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in the 1950s. Ultimately, the Berne Convention was signed in 1963 which resulted 
in the creation of the ICPR.
Progress following the creation of the ICPR remained slow for the next 
decade due to conflicts between the Dutch, who bore most of the cost of pollution, 
and France and Germany, where most of the polluting industries were located. In 
1976 a series of deals were reached resulting in the Convention on the Protection 
of the Rhine against Pollution by Chlorides (Chlorides Convention) and the 
Convention for the Protection of the Rhine against Chemical Pollution (Chemical 
Convention). The lengthy procedure to decide which chemicals to regulate slowed 
down the implementation process of the Chemical Convention. Ratification of 
the Chlorides Convention took even longer. In the meantime, frustrated Dutch 
gardeners, environmental groups, and water companies sued the French potassium 
mines and other polluters, and reached private settlements.
The disastrous chemical spill at Sandoz, Basel (Switzerland) in 1986 was 
widely considered a turning point in attempts to clean up the Rhine. A special 
minister’s conference was called a few weeks after the disaster, where the Dutch 
minister proposed an international agreement for improving the health of the 
ecosystem as a whole. The reintroduction of the salmon in the river and the 
control of non-point source pollution were two of the new goals of that effort 
(IKSR 1987; Bernauer and Moser 1996). This proposal became the basis for 
a Rhine Action Plan (RAP), which was adopted by ICPR members in 1987. 
The first edition of the RAP (1987–2000) was relatively successful. A crucial 
aspect of that success was continuing threats from the Dutch government and 
private parties to claim compensation for damages from upstream polluters, as 
well as Dutch flexibility to adopt innovative measures to clean up or facilitate 
the discharge of pollutants, and to give financial aid to upstream polluters for 
their mitigation activities. Subsequent agreements have built on the successes of 
the RAP, including additions to the Chlorides Convention, new goals for salmon 
restoration, further agreements between downstream and upstream users, and the 
renegotiation of the Berne treaty and the RAP (ICPR 1994; Frijters and Leentvaar 
2003; Mostert 2009).
4. Methods
This study was developed as part of the larger Social-Ecological Systems 
Metanalysis Database (SESMAD) project which analyses data on a series 
of physical, actor and governance factors that can be related to sustainable 
management of environmental commons (Cox 2014).
The SESMAD database is a relational database containing approximately 200 
variables relevant for the study of Social Ecological Systems (SES). The variables 
are stored in three tables. The case table contains general information about the 
SES, which is defined as a system containing at least one, but often more, of the 
following components: an environmental commons, a governance system, and 
an actor group. An environmental commons (EC) is an environmental resource 
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or pollutant that can be subjected to human use, production, and governance. 
An actor group (A) can be comprised of individuals, organizations, or nations 
that have developed a set of institutional arrangements in order to manage 
human interactions in a specific environmental system, or who alter resource 
characteristics through extraction or emission. A governance system (GS) is a set 
of institutional arrangements (such as rules, policies, and governance activities) 
that affect interaction between one or more actor groups and an environmental 
commons (EC). The component table records attributes of each of the above 
components. Interactions between these components are stored as records in 
the interactions (I) table. There are two main types of interactions: interactions 
between one or more actor groups and an environmental commons, as mediated 
by one or more governance systems; and interactions between two or more 
environmental commons. The tables can be also used to enter information about 
different temporal “snapshots” of the case, facilitating the identification of changes 
in the components, attributes and interactions over time.
Not all the variables included in the SESMAD database are relevant to test 
CPR theory. In this paper we focus on an initial selection of those that have 
consistently been mentioned by CPR scholars as contributing to sustainable 
management. For that purpose we rely on Agrawal (2001) and Poteete et al. 
(2010), two comprehensive syntheses of CPR theory. Additionally, we assessed 
the case with regard to the rest of variables contained in the SESMAD to explore 
the relevance of other factors not emphasized by the theory.
Data were mostly obtained via a content analysis of journal articles. 
Additionally we used data from primary sources (e.g. the text of agreements, 
reports produced by public organizations involved in river management and raw 
data produced by the ICPR), as well as “grey literature” produced by academic 
and research organizations (see Appendix 2 for a list of all the sources used). 
New sources were sampled until no significantly new information was obtained 
with the last source (Glaser and Strauss 1999). Coders worked collaboratively, 
and controversial information and coding decisions were double-checked with 
external experts.2
Case studies of complex phenomena like pollution in the Rhine face a 
problem of indiscriminate pluralism, i.e. the identification of causal relationships 
where multiple conditions seem to be contributing to an outcome and there are 
not enough counterfactuals to clarify which of them are more important and under 
which conditions (Steinberg 2007).3 To minimize that issue, we relied on three 
strategies. First, we tested predictions made by CPR theory for the case of pollution 
2
 The lack of a predetermined sample of sources and the fact that there was only one case to be coded 
made the collaborative coding strategy more appropriate than an independent coding strategy where 
one individual carries the coding and then reliability is checked against the independent coding of 
other individuals (Krippendorff 2004).
3
 This is also a concern in theories that have been built mostly on small-N studies, like CPR theory 
(Agrawal 2001).
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management and resource restoration in the Rhine. For example, CPR theory tells 
us that the presence of sanctioning mechanisms will contribute to cooperation 
and the effectiveness of governance measures aiming at improving environmental 
outcomes. Thus, given the relative success of the Rhine governance system, we 
expected that sanctioning mechanisms were present.
Second, we conducted a series of within-case comparisons to explain 
variation in environmental outcomes over time and across types of pollutants 
(George and Bennett 2005). Changes in governance characteristics over time 
were assessed against changes in pollution concentrations. Similarly, the degree 
of presence or absence of actor characteristics like heterogeneity, boundaries or 
size were compared across industrial and agricultural actor groups and evaluated 
against pollution concentration levels of point and non-point source pollutants, 
respectively. The development of a table highlighting relevant variables across 
those components was instrumental in the analysis (see Section 5.3). A third 
within-case comparison distinguishing upstream vs. downstream riparian 
nations was also used to understand the dynamics of institutional development 
and change.
Third, we used process tracing complementarily to within-case comparisons. 
Process tracing is a within-case inductive technique that lays out, usually in a 
linear fashion, the course of events that connect a cause and an effect (George 
and Bennett 2005; Collier 2011). The technique requires the disaggregation of 
a phenomenon into smaller pieces, or events, some of which occur at different 
points in time (Steinberg 2007), and their connection through a causal argument. 
Specifically, process tracing was useful to link the creation of the ICPR governance 
system to the improvement of point-source chemical pollution in the 1970s. This 
was carried by paying attention to, the development of a strong environmental 
monitoring network coordinated by the ICPR, the increasing watchdog role carried 
by interest groups and public awareness of the pollution problem, and the pro-
compliant behavior of industrial polluters to abate chemical emissions. Similarly, 
process tracing became handy to link the occurrence of the Sandoz disaster and 
the qualitative leap in the protection of the Rhine. In that process we focused on 
the role of the Dutch leadership, the approval of the RAP and the collaborative 
turn in the approach to pollution abatement. Our process tracing exercise draws 
primarily on the process tracing conducted by the authors we reviewed, which we 
have reproduced to the extent possible.
Also, we structure the paper findings across four general processes that help 
to understand the contribution of the variables under study to the relative success 
of the Rhine case.
5. Results
5.1. Structure of the case
Figure 2 shows the structure of the case. First, we distinguish three types of 
environmental commons: point-source pollutants like Cadmium or Zinc, non-
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point source pollutants like nitrogen and phosphorous, and natural resources like 
salmon. Second, we identify one governance system and two relevant governance 
periods. One period goes from 1976 to 1986 and corresponds to the approval 
and initial implementation of the Chemicals Convention, and the second goes 
from 1986 to 2000 and corresponds to the adoption and implementation of the 
first edition of the RAP. As shown in the Figure, one difference between these 
two governance periods is the interest of the RAP in managing non-point source 
pollutants and natural resources in addition to the focus on point source pollution 
control. This is not the only difference, however, as will be further explained 
in the following section. Finally, we identify three clusters of actor groups: the 
riparian nations, industrial users, and agricultural users.
5.2. Outcomes of the case
The point of departure of our analysis is a review of concentrations of point 
and non-point source pollutants and oxygen in the Rhine across the two 
periods under analysis. Heavy metals like Cadmium and Zinc are used here 
as an indicator of broader patterns in point-source pollution. Although there 
are diffuse sources of Cadmium and Zinc, most emissions in the 1970s came 
from point-sources (Stigliani et al. 1993). As Figure 3 illustrates, there was 
a clear decrease of concentration levels since the second half of the 1970s, 
GS: Chemical Conventions 
EC: Point source pollutants
A: Point source polluters
A: Riparian nations 
EC: Salmon
Rhine river basin governance
interactions (1986–2000)
Governance interactions Biophysical interactions
GS: Rhine action plan
Rhine River Basin Governance
Interactions (1976–1986)
A: Non-Point source polluters EC: Non-point sourcepollutants
Figure 2: Structure of the Rhine SES during the two snapshots coded. The figure highlights the 
interaction between components.
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(see particularly the trend for Cadmium). As a matter of fact, the emission 
of many chemical pollutant were reduced between 80% and 90% during that 
decade (Verweij 2000). By the beginning of the 1980s, the trend became much 
less clear; and it is not until the second half of the 1980s when we find a new 
inflexion point (see particularly Zinc in Figure 3). Indeed, between 1988 and 
2000 Rhine companies again accomplished an 80% to 90% reduction in levels 
of many chemical pollutants in their wastewater discharges (Verweij 2000). 
That said, the levels of some heavy metals in suspended matter of the Rhine 
were still high at the beginning of the 2000s, as a result of long residence times 
(Froehlich-Schmitt 2003).
Nitrogen and Phosphorous are used in Figure 3 as indicators of broad 
trends of non-point source pollution. Nitrogen originates mostly in the 
agricultural sector. Phosphorous originates in the agricultural sector and also 
the urban sector (Froehlich-Schmitt 2003). As shown in Figure 3, phosphorous 
concentration levels decreased notably from 1986 on. Emissions decreased 
from 72,400 tP/a in 1985 to 25,400 tP/a in 1996 (a decrease well above the 
50% reduction prescribed in the RAP). These reductions, however, were the 
result of a 77% reduction from urban point sources (reduced sewage and water 
treatment effluent), 76% reduction from industrial point sources, and a 59% 
reduction from diffuse, i.e. agricultural, sources (Farmer and Braun 2002). 
Nitrogen concentrations show a more moderate decrease than phosphorous 
concentrations. Emissions decreased from 600,000 tN/a in 1985 to 452,000 
tN/a in 1996 (Farmer and Braun 2002). This resulted from a 50% reduction 
from point sources and an 8% from diffuse sources. As in the case of some 
heavy metals, nitrogen concentrations at the beginning of the 2000s were still 
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far from acceptable levels, but notably lower than in the 1970s (Farmer and 
Braun 2002; Froehlich-Schmitt 2003).4
Oxygen levels are treated as a proxy for ecosystem health. In this case, the 
increasing trend is an indicator of the overall success of the governance regime 
(Figure 3).
Another indicator of the ecological conditions of the Rhine is salmon. Salmon 
are a good proxy for a number of ecosystem services provided by the Rhine 
because salmon require clean water, naturally connected river basins, and an 
abundance and diversity of aquatic invertebrates. Over-fishing, channelization 
and damming in the late 19th and early 20th centuries reduced salmon stocks 
tremendously. The subsequent decline in water quality contributed to the extinction 
of salmon stocks by the 1940s (De Groot 1992, 2002; Nienhuis et al. 2002). The 
progressive improvement of oxygen levels since at least the 1970s facilitated the 
implementation of the RAP’s goal of restoring salmon stocks from the mid-1980s 
on. From the 1950s to 1989 six salmon were caught in the entire Rhine watershed, 
and between 1989 and 1992, the number increased to 18 (van Dijk et al. 1995). 
Salmon stocks continued to improve in subsequent years thanks also to an active 
policy to restore the natural river bed of the Rhine (Froehlich-Schmitt 2003).
5.3. Influential CPR variables
According to our analysis, a number of factors help to understand the performance 
of the governance system vis à vis point and non-point source pollutants over 
time. Specifically, we find that 14 factors can be associated with the outcomes 
of the case (Table 2). Their hypothesized effect on pollution abatement can be 
summarized in four overarching processes contributing to cooperation: linking 
environmental information to polluter behavior, self-organizing, brokering 
cooperation, and guaranteeing rule compliance. We structure the presentation of 
our results along these lines.
5.3.1. Linking environmental information to polluter behavior
The ability of the ICPR to affect pollution patterns depended to a great extent on 
its ability to link environmental information to polluter behavior. We associate 
this observation to two variables which are emphasized in CPR theory: the 
existence of strong environmental monitoring systems and the clarity of the 
underlying biophysical boundaries of the system. According to CPR theory, 
information fosters transparency and thus cooperation among users (Ostrom et al. 
1994). Also, environmental monitoring permits the assessment and adjustment of 
management measures to changing local conditions (Cox et al. 2010). In the case 
4
 The difference between emission control efforts of point and non-point source polluters is also 
visible within the group of heavy metals and the group of nutrients. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
industry decreased its phosphorous and nitrogen emissions proportionally more than the agricultural 
sector (Behrendt et al. 2002; de Wit et al. 2002; Farmer and Braun 2002), and the agricultural sec-
tor decreased its heavy metal emissions proportionally less than the industry (Stigliani et al. 1993).
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Table 2: Relevant variables in the Rhine case.
Theoretical variable 
(SESMAD component) 
 Snapshot 1 (1976–1986)  Snapshot 2 (1986–2000)
Physical variables
Well defined physical 
boundaries (EC)
 Yes. The Rhine’s superficial flows are clearly identifiable and well 
understood. The Rhine’s aquifers are also well identified.
Governance-resource 
match (I)
 Yes. The ICPR regimea encompasses the Rhine’s catchment area 
including indirectly a number of its tributaries.
Social variables
Small group size (A)  Yes for riparian nations (6) and big industrial firms (concentrated into 
industrial poles)
 Less the case for farmers
Clarity of social 
boundaries (A)
 Yes for riparian nations and big industrial firms (organized into sectors 
and associations). 
 Less the case for farmers (due to larger number of sectors and 
associations) 
Heterogeneity (A)  High for riparian nations: self-
centered approach to bargaining; 
upstream vs. downstream.
 Low for riparian nations: 
Common interest in 
ecosystem restoration 
supersedes differences
 Moderate/Low. The industrial and farming sectors are not interested 
in pollution abatement by default. Industry enjoys more homogeneous 
technology than agricultural sector. 
Proportionality (I)  No. Riparian nations struggled to 
allocate abatement costs and benefits
 Yes. Integrative bargaining 
approach among nations that 
allowed for trade-offs
 Big industrial firms enjoyed favorable market trends
Social monitoring (I)  Only nascent among big industrial 
firms
 Big industrial firms report 
to national governments 
and ICPR; not generalized 
monitoring among farmers
 Watchdog role by environmental groups, downstream municipalities and 
water works associations
Trust/Reciprocity (A)  Moderate among national 
governments; bargaining not based on 
trust, but on a legalistic approach 
 High. Momentum after 
Sandoz disaster promotes 
hands-off-based management
Leadership (A)  Yes. Adversarial approach by 
the Netherlands. Lack of enough 
authority and accountability to 
counterparts
 Yes. Integrative approach 
by the Netherlands. Sandoz 
disaster opens window of 
opportunity (i.e. authority) to 
bring change (RAP)
Governance variables
Environmental 
monitoring (I)
 Yes. Progressively consolidated and expanded network of stations for 
data collection and analysis.
Nesting/Multilevel (I)  Yes. Horizontal interplay among 
nations, vertical interplay within 
countries. Horizontal interplay among 
big industrial firms 
 Yes. National governments 
and big industrial firms’ 
efforts are integrated 
horizontally and vertically 
respectively
 Important members of the ICPR are also members of the European 
Economic Community which started developing binding regulations on 
water quality in the beginning of the seventies 
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Theoretical variable 
(SESMAD component) 
 Snapshot 1 (1976–1986)  Snapshot 2 (1986–2000)
Sanctions (I)  Yes. Neither the Chemical Conventions nor the RAP foresee sanctions 
but there is that possibility at national levels. Through the respective 
Conferences of the Ministers the ICPR has proved crucial in the 
development of stricter regulations at national levels
Non-CPR variables
Interest groups  Nascent watchdog role of 
environmental and waterworks 
associations. 
 High impact of interest 
groups’ watchdog role on 
environmental awareness, as 
powered by national courts, 
and media coveragea.
External disturbances  Sandoz disaster and its media coverage triggered peak in environmental 
awareness and forced a turn in governance, as also had previous 
ecological disturbances done in the past.
aThe ICPR does not directly encompass the whole catchment area. However, for the benefit of the 
Rhine and its main tributaries like Moselle and Sarre, the members of the ICPR (Switzerland, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands and the European Commission) successfully co-operate with Austria, 
Liechtenstein, the Belgian region of Wallonia and Italy (Mostert 2009).
Note: A: Actor table; EC: Environmental Commons table; I: Interactions table.
Table 2: Continued
of the Rhine, environmental monitoring allowed for the emergence of a close-
knit scientific community and an advanced understanding of the dynamics and 
potential solutions to the pollution problem, which was fundamental to assign 
pollution abatement responsibilities among polluters (Bernauer and Moser 1996; 
Raadgever 2005).
The environmental monitoring network in the Rhine is strong in large part 
because it has a long history and is based on diverse institutions. One of the 
main accomplishments of the Berne Convention was gathering and publishing 
information about concentrations of pollutants in the watershed (Bernauer and Moser 
1996). In the 1970s, the International Commission for the Hydrology of the Rhine 
Basin (CHR) was created to strengthen data exchange and standardize measuring 
methods. The Chlorides and Chemicals conventions signed in the mid-70s led to 
the consolidation of a network of measuring stations that enabled an assessment 
of the influence of upstream polluters within the Rhine and its main tributaries 
on pollution concentrations (Huisman et al. 2000). The increased availability of 
information and its centralization in the ICPR facilitated the watchdog role played 
by downstream interest groups and nations and an increasing public awareness of 
pollution activities by the chemical industry. The court cases of the Dutch market 
gardeners and Reinwater against the French potassium mines in the early 1970s 
– some of which were apparently only settled in the beginning of the last decade – 
are paradigmatic in that regard but not the only evidence. Already in the 1960s, the 
Rhine’s Waterworks Commission (RIWA), one of the most active interest groups 
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against pollution in the Rhine, had manifested an interest in improving the usability 
of the ICPRs monitoring system by requesting an enlargement of the pollutants 
being surveyed (Gurtner-Zimmermann 1998; Disco 2007).
Ultimately, the awareness raising actions of interest groups like the RIWA 
and others created an image of “sick river in Europe” that set the path for the 
chemical industry to adopt a pro-active role in pollution control (Nollkaemper 
1990; Bernauer and Moser 1996; Verweij 2000; Disco 2007; Mostert 2009). 
“Even notorious polluters like the huge chemical firm BASF in Ludwigshafen 
invested capital amounts in new (and well-publicised) wastewater treatment 
plants and, very gradually, a number of indicators of pollution began to show a 
downward trend for the first time in nearly 100 years of measurements” (Disco 
2007). With the RAP, monitoring efforts expanded from the assessment of ambient 
concentrations to the supervision of emissions by industrial firms. Over the years, 
the monitoring program increased the frequency of sampling, the number of 
parameters measured, as well as the speed of diagnosis and information diffusion 
in case of major spills or other disasters. This emphasized the need to improve 
the governance of non-point source pollutants like nitrogen, which currently 
constitutes one of the main concerns of the ICPR (ICPR 2012e,f).
The development of the monitoring network was facilitated by the relatively 
clear boundaries of the Rhine’s hydrological system and its fit with the boundaries 
of the governance system. Although the hydrological system includes both surface 
and underground waters, the latter are confined to well understood regional 
aquifers (Uehlinger et al. 2009). In addition, a series of ‘corrections’ to the river 
bed for flood-protection and agricultural production (i.e. dams and river channels) 
over the 19th and 20th Centuries further delimited the boundaries of the river 
and its connectivity to the rest of the hydrological system (Wieriks and Schulte-
Wülwer-Leidig 2009). Finally, the system is almost entirely confined within the 
borders of the ICPR nation states (see Figure 1).
5.3.2. Self-organizing
The Rhine’s governance system emerged and has evolved as a multi-level enterprise 
of self-organized actor groups like the riparian nations and the industrial polluters. 
According to CPR theory, the nesting of self-organized enterprises at multiple 
levels of governance levels aids collective action by splitting ventures among 
a large number of actors into smaller enterprises with reduced transaction costs 
(Ostrom 1990; Lam 2006; Cox et al. 2010). Also, “nesting a set of local institutions 
into a network of medium- to larger-scale institutions helps ensure that larger-scale 
problems are addressed as well as those that are smaller” (Anderies et al. 2004). 
This is particularly clear with regard to the group of riparian nations. Individual 
resource users are nested within a small number of nation states that engage in 
collective decision-making and bargaining. This avoids the need for coordination 
between a huge number of players, which would have led to prohibitive transaction 
costs. An example is the basin-wide environmental monitoring system which 
relies on the measuring and reporting efforts of governments and the watchdog 
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role of a number of national level interest groups (Stigliani et al. 1993; Bernauer 
and Moser 1996; Dieperink 2000).
The nesting aspect is also evident with regard to the European multi-level 
governance system of which the ICPR is a part. Political cooperation at the 
European level facilitated the successful organization among the riparian nations 
within the ICPR in at least three regards. First, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the subsequent European Community (EC) helped overcome World 
War II animosities and created binding economic dependency between nations like 
France and Germany. Second, the EU regime was explicitly designed as a multi-
level governance system, and this permitted embracing and encouraging regional 
initiatives like the ICPR (Frijters and Leentvaar 2003; Mostert 2009). Third, the 
EU environmental legislation, of which water law has always been a frontrunner 
(e.g. Urban Wastewater Directive, 30/05/1991; Nitrate Directive, 91/676/EEC; 
Dangerous Substances Directive, 76/464/EEC; the Water Framework Directive, 
2000/60/EC, etc.) is binding on EU member states. As further explained in a 
section below, those rules were actively appealed by interest groups at the national 
level to enforce ICPR measures (Dieperink 2000; Disco 2007).
A series of actor characteristics emphasized by CPR theory help to explain the 
ability of the groups of riparian nations and industrial polluters to self-organize. 
Those characteristics include the existence of clear social boundaries, the size of 
the groups, and the homogeneity of interests.
According to CPR theory, clear social boundaries help to internalize positive 
and negative externalities at low cost, ensuring that those who bear the costs of 
cooperating are the ones who receive the benefits (Ostrom et al. 1994; Cox et al. 
2010). Furthermore, small group size can be associated with reduced costs of 
coming to agreements and monitoring (Olson 1965; Ostrom et al. 1994; Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004; Poteete et al. 2010). In pollution cases, clear social boundaries 
and small group size can facilitate the assignment of pollution abatement 
responsibilities across different actor groups as well as the emergence and 
development of cooperation among agents within each group. This seems to have 
been the case of the group of riparian nations and the industry in the Rhine.
Most of the Rhine basin is contained within the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Switzerland and Luxemburg. These countries and the European Commission (EC) 
are represented in the ICPR. Very small portions of the watershed also fall within with 
Austria, Lichtenstein, Italy, and the Wallonie region of Belgium. These countries are 
consulted but do not have veto power in the ICPR. Running the ICPR with 5 rather 
than 9 veto members should have reduced bargaining costs significantly. Moreover, 
the political costs of exiting ICPR agreements have increased over time with the rise 
of public environmental awareness (Dieperink 2000).
Similarly, industry in the Rhine is clustered into only 6 industrial complexes5
 
(ICPR 2012e) and a relatively small number of sectors. Some of those sectors, like 
5
 This includes the clusters of Basel/Mulhouse/Freiburg, Strasbourg, Rhine-Neckar, Frankfurt-
Rhine-Main, Metropolitan region Rhine-Ruhr, and Rotterdam-Europoort.
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the chemical and the metal sectors, contain just a handful of big firms6 (Stigliani 
et al. 1993) that coordinate through federations at the national and European levels 
(Raadgever 2005). For example, this is evident in Germany, where “both the 
German Association of the Chemical Industry (VCI) and the Abwassertechnische 
Vereinigung (the professional association of German wastewater specialists) have 
been motors behind the massive investments in water and air protection undertaken 
by the chemical firms” (Verweij 2000, 1036).7 In contrast to the riparian nations 
and industry, the number of farmers is much higher and more spread out (ICPR 
2012e). This makes cooperation for pollution control much more costly among 
farmers than among the industrial firms8. The dearth of references to pollution 
control efforts made by farmer associations within the literature is revealing in 
that regard. The difficulty the ICPR has experienced in monitoring fragmented 
agricultural emissions is also congruent with the argument (ICPR 2012e).
Small group size does not necessarily guarantee cooperation. Rather, it is 
usually mediated by the heterogeneity of interests within the groups (Poteete 
and Ostrom 2004). When heterogeneity of interests is high the internal politics 
of reaching agreements may involve high transaction costs. Alternatively, 
homogeneity of interests facilitates common understanding, eases the formation 
of collective agreements and adds certainty about behavioral patterns and 
cooperation (Varughese and Ostrom 2001; Poteete and Ostrom 2004; Poteete et al. 
2010). In the Rhine case, this factor helps to explain the cooperative turn of the 
nation states in the mid-1980s. In the 1970s and early 1980s national governments 
were concerned about protecting their economies from the costs of pollution and 
pollution abatement (Bernauer and Moser 1996; Verweij 1999, 2000; Dieperink 
2000). There was clear asymmetry between the Netherlands, which bore the 
most pollution cost due to its downstream location, and the other nations, which 
potentially bore the most pollution abatement cost (Mostert 2009).
The situation changed with the Sandoz disaster, which served to raise public 
awareness of, and thus the political costs of failing to address, the pollution problem. 
The chemical spill affected the entire basin from its head, and environmental 
groups used it to blame governments for their failure to control pollution, both 
in upstream and downstream countries. The increased homogeneity of interests 
(i.e. of political costs for governments) translated into the approval of the RAP 
and the creation of a more flexible approach to governance based on side-
agreements and self-responsibility. By these means, the RAP aimed at promoting 
collaboration through the identification of common interests. The RAP’s new 
6
 The chemical sector includes 6 major firms. Also, in the 1970s, only two thermal zinc smelters 
located on the river were the source of around 50% of all aqueous emissions (Stigliani et al. 1993).
7
 The importance of the activities of these professional associations for the cleanup of the Rhine 
becomes clear when one considers that Germany’s largest chemical firms are located on the Rhine 
waterway.
8
 To be clear, the agricultural sector in the Rhine area is well organized (Raadgever 2005), but not 
for pollution abatement purposes.
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focus on ecosystem restoration, an activity from which upstream and downstream 
countries benefit more equally than with pollution control, is another piece of 
evidence in that regard (Verweij 1999, 2000; Mostert 2009).
5.3.3. Brokering cooperation
Understanding the institutional developments in the 1970s and the 1980s 
requires paying attention to the role of leaders, particularly the Dutch 
government. According to CPR theory, leaders can reduce the costs of 
agreement formation, as well as perform more general functions such as trust 
building, conflict management, knowledge diffusion, and mobilization for 
change (Ostrom 1992).
In the Rhine case, the Dutch government played a leadership role at different 
points in time with mixed results (Verweij 1999; Dieperink 2000). The Dutch 
government was one of the first governments to create regulations to control 
pollution at the national level as well as to raise the issue of water quality in 
the Rhine at the international level. The first steps towards the creation of the 
ICPR were the result of lobbying by the Dutch national and local governments, 
and Dutch waterworks associations (Bernauer and Moser 1996; Dieperink 2000; 
Disco 2007). However, the Dutch lacked authority to enforce agreements on 
other countries and their credibility was undermined by an adversarial approach 
to dealing with upstream polluters. With the Sandoz disaster, a window of 
opportunity for change opened and this was used by the Dutch minister of 
transport to bring to the table a more integrative model of governance that gave 
birth to the RAP. Despite its lack of strong authority or reputation as an impartial 
party, the Dutch were ultimately able to induce change (Verweij 1999; Dieperink 
2000).
5.3.4. Guaranteeing compliance
Compliance with regulations is key to the performance of governance systems. 
We argue that the effective compliance with formal agreements by the riparian 
nations from the 1980s on is correlated with an increase in the proportionality 
of the distribution of costs and benefits as well as in the levels of trust among 
nations. Compliance in the case of industrial polluters can also be understood by 
considering proportionality of costs and benefits, as well as rule enforcement by 
national governments.
According to CPR theory, the likelihood of cooperation increases when agents 
perceive that costs and benefits associated with their cooperative efforts are fair as 
compared to the costs and benefits of others (Agrawal 2001; Trawick 2001; Cox 
et al. 2010). In the same vein, the existence of trust in the reciprocal behavior of 
others has been shown to enhance cooperation (Ostrom 1998; Ostrom and Walker 
2005). In the Rhine case, the heterogeneity of interests among the riparian nations 
in the 1970s translated into a zero-sum bargaining approach. Additionally, the 
excessive reliance on regulations to control emissions prescribed by the Chemicals 
Convention, prevented the consolidation of trust among the parties (Raadgever 
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2005).9 This was associated with suboptimal outcomes (Nollkaemper 1990). 
Point source pollution emissions had notably reduced during the 1970s but then 
stabilized in the 1980s above desirable levels (Verweij 2000). More importantly, 
the issue of non-point source pollution was ignored. The situation changed with 
the approval of the RAP. The new Plan increased the proportionality of costs 
and benefits among the nations by facilitating side-agreements and compensatory 
measures. Also, the Plan enhanced trust by eliminating procedural requirements 
such as technical implementation standards at the domestic level (Verweij 1999). 
All this contributed to a more pro-active and collaborative conduct by governmental 
agencies, the industry, and interest groups (Gurtner-Zimmermann 1998; Disco 
2007), ultimately leading to an improvement in ecological outcomes (Mostert 
2009). A series of side agreements between Dutch cities and interest groups, and 
upstream polluters in France and Germany, in the late 1980s/early 1990s, after 
more than a decade of confrontation, are paradigmatic of the collaborative turn.
The pollution reduction efforts made by big chemical and metal industries 
right from the 1970s can be also understood from a cost-benefit approach, as those 
efforts were facilitated by a period of economic growth and increasing revenues, 
helping finance investments in new, more efficient technologies (Bernauer and 
Moser 1996). Further, some authors argue that a number of big chemical firms 
treated the challenge of developing new wastewater treatment technologies as an 
opportunity to capture a new market niche (MPR 2001). This was not the case of 
the farming sector. In the 1970s, the sector in many European countries was going 
through an important reconversion of its productive structures to accommodate 
to the growing European common market and global competition (Fennell 
1997). This translated in a long-term effort to reallocate production efforts across 
countries and intensify productivity and has constituted the main mission of the 
European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) until very recently. The costs of 
reconversion were large for some subsectors across Europe (Grant 1997). Thus, 
much of the mission of the CAP was to compensate via a program of production 
incentives and price support mechanisms. In this context it is reasonable to expect 
that the farming sector was not particularly concerned about the need to include in 
their calculus of costs and benefits a more rational use of fertilizers and pesticides.
Rule enforcement, i.e. monitoring and sanctioning, has been emphasized in 
the CPR literature as one of the most important factors stimulating cooperation for 
its contribution to rule compliance (Gibson et al. 2005; Coleman and Steed 2009). 
The Chemicals Convention did not include any sanctioning mechanism at the 
international level (Nollkaemper 1996). However, regulations at the national level 
did and this was effectively used several times by interest groups to force upstream 
firms to comply with emission limits and/or to compensate downstream users for 
9
 It is important to recall at this point that, until 1987, the governments of the ICPR members fought 
intensively over details of this governance regime (culminating in the Dutch ambassador’s recall 
from Paris in 1979). As a consequence of these struggles, the 1976 Salt and Chemical Conventions 
were barely implemented (Verweij 2000).
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pollution externalities (Nollkaemper 1990). Additionally, the extensive political 
and legal activity by national governments within the ICPR in the 1970s was 
seen by the industrial firms as the prelude to stricter regulations in the Rhine. The 
interest in anticipating such regulations also motivated firms to reduce emissions 
(Bernauer and Moser 1996). Later on, the RAP did not add any sanctioning 
provisions to the governance system; however, it further strengthened monitoring 
by integrating the industrial sector within the environmental information systems.
6. Discussion
According to our results, a number of variables from CPR theory help to 
understand the progress made by the riparian nations with regard to pollution 
control during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the pollution abatement efforts 
carried by a number of industries (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). Those factors 
include physical attributes such as the existence of clear hydrological boundaries 
of the watershed; governance factors such as the articulation of environmental 
monitoring and decision-making at different governance levels; and actor 
characteristics like small group size, the relatively concentrated location of some 
actor groups (i.e. riparian nations and the industrial sectors) and the leadership 
role played by the Netherlands. Although the Chemicals Convention was not 
initially fully implemented, it set the path for pollution abatement efforts by 
industrial polluters and the consequent reduction in the emissions of a number of 
point-source pollutants.
The failure of the Chemical Convention to be fully implemented points to 
the relevance of a number of other CPR factors. These include insufficient trust 
and the presence of heterogeneities of interests among upstream and downstream 
nations, as well as the limited proportionality in the allocation of the costs and 
benefits of implementing the Convention. The collaborative turn of the riparian 
nations in the mid-1980s correlated with a change in the values of those variables 
and a new leadership role played by the Dutch government.
Other CPR factors, such as the right of actors to self-organize and participate 
in collective decisions, the productivity of the resource system, communication 
among actors or resource dependence were found to be irrelevant or in need of 
qualification.
First, according to CPR theory, allowing resource users to self-organize 
contributes to cooperation and the development of institutional regimes that are 
adapted to different contexts (Ostrom 1990). The literature on self-regulation 
by industry may provide valuable insights regarding the positive role that CPR 
theories assigns to actors’ right to self-organize. In this literature, the particular 
role of sanctions is debated (King and Lenox 2000). Some argue that penalties and 
sanctions are required to prevent firms from free riding on the efforts of others 
(e.g. Greif 1997), while others hold that the need for such sanctions is overstated 
because the firm behavior can be controlled through the transference of norms 
and the diffusion of best practices (e.g. Nash and Ehrenfeld 1997). Our results 
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do not provide conclusive answers to the questions posed in this debate. In the 
Rhine, both the industrial and agricultural sectors have actively used their right to 
self-organize into associations for different purposes, but only the latter translated 
their right to self-organize into significant efforts to control pollution. Autonomy 
may be necessary, but is not necessarily sufficient for successful outcomes.
Second, CPR theory stresses the importance of the collective choice: 
resource users must be able to participate in decisions that affect their use of 
the resource. This factor is also believed to contribute to cooperation (Ostrom 
1990) but its relevance for the Rhine case is inconclusive, as neither the industrial 
or agricultural sectors are directly represented in the decision-making processes 
within the ICPR on a regular basis (ICPR 2012c). The notion of collective choice 
was developed with regard to local contexts, where opportunities for collective 
choice are limited to direct participation and relatively simple structures of 
representation. In large, international contexts like the Rhine’s there are many 
other possibilities to influence decision-making, including lobbying national and 
international decision-making bodies and using the mass media. Further research 
should develop new operational definitions of the idea of collective choice for the 
study of large scale governance.
Third, CPR theory posits that resource users are more eager to cooperate and 
invest in the conservation of a resource if the resource has at least certain level 
of productivity (Poteete et al. 2010). In the Rhine case, however, the riparian 
nations took collective measures to control pollution only after the 1960s, more 
than a decade after salmon stocks and the biological productivity of the river 
had reached their poorest state (i.e. zero productivity). That said, we cannot rule 
out the possibility that without productivity being an issue, measures to control 
pollution would have been taken even later.
Fourth, CPR theory argues that communication is a crucial for cooperation 
(Ostrom et al. 1994). While the ICPR was created upon a schedule of regular 
meetings among the riparian nation’s representatives (ICPR 2012a) such 
communication did not prevent the stalemate in the implementation of the 
Chemical’s Convention in the 1970s. Thus, communication may be a prerequisite 
for cooperation but it is not sufficient, particularly in large-scale contexts like the 
Rhine’s, where the impact of communication on commitment for collective action 
is frequently mediated by the need to accommodate diversity of interests.
Fifth, there is the factor of dependence. According to CPR scholarship, unless 
individuals depend on an environmental commons they will not have incentives 
to sustain it (Ostrom 1992; Ostrom et al. 1994). The Rhine case illustrates the 
importance of economic dependence both to understand cooperation and the lack 
of it. The pro-collaboration role played by the Dutch government is justified if 
we consider the exposure of the Netherlands to the decreased water quality of the 
Rhine, while the resistance of riparian nations like Germany or France to pollution 
control mechanisms in the 1970s can be understood with regard to the dependence 
of their economies on polluting activities. Additionally, the case illustrates that 
cultural salience may play an important role too. The focus on salmon restoration 
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in the mid-1980s cannot be understood with regard to economic incentives, for 
salmon stocks (and many other fish species) had been extinct since the 1940s. 
However, salmon held important cultural salience as a result of a growing 
environmental movement. This movement emphasized the intrinsic value of the 
Rhine’s ecosystem for more than a decade and ultimately constituted the basis for 
the political crisis triggered by the Sandoz disaster (Mostert 2009).
Two factors not explicitly discussed in CPR theory are relevant for the Rhine 
case (see Table 2). Those factors include the role of interest groups and the 
occurrence of disturbances.10
First, environmental groups, waterworks associations and local governments 
played an important role as watchdog and environmental-awareness promoters 
from the 1970s onwards. They benefited from the increasing availability of 
environmental information about pollution in the watershed and the coercive 
power of regulations at the national level (Nollkaemper 1990; Bernauer and 
Moser 1996; Mostert 2009). The pressure exerted by those actors over upstream 
polluters during the 1970s (see timeline for examples) emerged as a reaction to the 
limited progress that national governments had made since the Berne Convention 
and contributed to increase the effectiveness of the emerging governance system 
(Dieperink 2000).
Second, the Sandoz disaster and its media coverage prompted a peak in 
awareness about the pollution status of the Rhine, and this opened a window 
of opportunity for reform. As a matter of fact, that was not the first time that 
a disturbance had triggered a governance change in the watershed. An accident 
similar to the Sandoz disaster in the 1960s11 led to the emergence of new interest 
groups for the protection of the Rhine and negotiations that led to the Berne 
agreements (Bernauer and Moser 1996; Dieperink 2000; Disco 2007). The 
importance of disturbances is not completely alien to CPR theory. An increasing 
number of scholars are paying attention to the influence of different types of 
threats on sustainable management and cooperation (Janssen and Anderies 2007; 
Schoon and Cox 2011). The Rhine case confirms the relevance of that research 
agenda.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have aimed to understand the sustainable management of 
pollution problems in a large, trans-boundary watershed like the Rhine. In that 
process, we have also tested the extent to which the effects of variables identified 
10
 By referring to these factors as not included in CPR theory we do not mean that the factors cannot 
affect CPR variables. As mentioned in this and the previous section, interest groups did play a crucial 
role in monitoring and sanctioning industrial polluters. Similarly, the Sandoz disaster strengthened 
the leadership role played by Dutch government and its effective promotion of the RAP. 
11
 In June 1969, an accidental spill of the insecticide Endosulfan by Hoechst Chemicals caused a 
massive fish kill in the Main, one of the most important tributaries of the Rhine.
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by CPR theory to explain sustainable management at local levels are applicable to 
problems other than conventional appropriation or provision problems.
According to our results, CPR theory can help to understand the relative 
success of the Rhine’s governance system vis-à-vis pollution management. The 
theory helps to understand the sustained collaboration among the riparian nations 
for more than four decades and the gap in performance between point-source 
and non-point source pollution abatement. The analysis also illustrates the need 
to qualify the role of certain key variables proposed by CPR theory, such as 
leadership and resource dependence, as well as to consider new variables such as 
the role of interest groups and the occurrence of disturbances.
The main goal of this paper was to test whether CPR theory applies in the 
context of large-scale water pollution problems, and address an important critique 
about the theory’s limited generalizability beyond local CPR management 
contexts. For that purpose, we systematically coded and synthesized insights 
from studies of the Rhine case about governance, actor and pollutant attributes 
and their interactions. The focus on interactions allowed us to assess the nexus 
between governance and environmental outcomes over time and across types of 
pollutants and polluters.
Although there are numerous accounts of variation in performance of the 
ICPR, explanations of it are rather fragmented and focused either on the over 
time or the point vs. non-point source dimensions. The use of CPR theory and the 
focus on interactions allowed us to provide a consistent explanation of the relative 
success of the Rhine case across both dimensions. Also, our use of the SESMAD 
illustrates the potential of relational databases to develop single case studies in 
addition to the more common development of comparative or large-N analyses 
(Young and Zürn 2006; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012). Finally the strong conceptual and 
theoretical foundations of CPR theory make the theory a very good starting point 
to explain governance and environmental outcomes at large scales, and contribute 
to theory building within the international environmental regimes and river basin 
management fields. We hope with this study to inspire further qualifications 
and extensions of the theory as well as connections to other theories within the 
abovementioned fields.
Our review of the major publications on Rhine governance shows that there 
is a connection between explanatory variables proposed by CPR theory, the 
design and development of the ICPR governance system, and the improvement of 
environmental outcomes in the Rhine. The notable reduction in the concentration 
of point source pollutants from the 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s can be 
linked to the effective monitoring system coordinated by the ICPR (Nollkaemper 
1990; Mostert 2009), the social and judicial pressure exerted by interest groups 
(Bernauer and Moser 1996), the favorable economic context the market incentives 
to develop pollution efficient technologies and the self-organization capacity of 
the chemical industry (Verweij 2000). By the mid-1980s the chemical corporations 
in the Rhine basin had reduced their discharges of toxics to a far greater degree 
than required by the legal norms. This contrasts with the limited progress made 
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within the ICPR to implement the Chemicals Convention (Nollkaemper 1990; 
Verweij 2000), but is congruent with other aspects of the broader governance 
system. In addition to the abovementioned monitoring capacity, the ICPR resulted 
in extensive political and legal activity by national governments, which was seen 
by the industrial firms as the prelude to stricter regulations in the Rhine. The 
interest in anticipating such regulations motivated the sector to reduce emissions.
Despite the progress made with regard to point source pollution, by the 
beginning of the 1980s, it became increasingly clear that the efforts proposed to 
reach a significant improvement of the quality of the Rhine had become deadlocked 
(Nollkaemper 1990) or were not as successful as expected compared to similar 
cases (Verweij 2000). With the Sandoz disaster, the RAP and the collaborative turn, 
point-source pollution control received a new stimulus (Gurtner-Zimmermann 
1998). More importantly, non-point source pollution became a priority in the 
policy agenda. Until then, non-point source pollution had been largely ignored 
by the ICPR and riparian nations. Also, the agricultural sector, the main source of 
non-point source pollutants like phosphorous and nitrogen, had not enjoyed the 
conditions that had favored voluntary pollution control efforts in the chemical 
industry. After the RAP, nitrogen concentrations started decreasing at a noticeable 
rate, arguably due to greater efforts to reduce agricultural emissions (Farmer and 
Braun 2002; Froehlich-Schmitt 2003; Prasuhn and Sieber 2005).
Our ability to reconstruct the entire chain of causality between governance and 
outcomes is limited for two reasons: data availability and the absence of a clear 
theory on the relationship between cooperation and other sustainability factors.
First, our reliance on within case comparisons and process tracing was 
constrained by the data we used. The Rhine is one single case, i.e. one among 
many examples of large scale resource governance. This makes our findings 
generalizable only to similar cases. Similarly, data collection relied on databases 
and secondary sources. Although the sources were numerous, our ability to 
address alternative hypotheses would have been higher if based on our own field 
data. This is particularly evident with regard to our inability to draw clear findings 
about the role of the agricultural sector in the Rhine case. Differences in term of 
self-organization capacity, economic incentives, and visibility to watchdog groups 
and the judicial system can explain why the agricultural sector did not develop the 
same pollution control efforts during the 1970s; however, the connection between 
the collaborative governance turn and the reduction in nitrogen and phosphorous 
emissions from diffuse sources after the mid-1980s on the one hand, and potential 
changes in some of the above cooperation factors on the other is less clear. Many 
authors point to the (slight but still significant) decrease of non-point source 
(i.e. agricultural) pollution and its connection to the mid-1980s governance turn 
(Stigliani et al. 1993; de Wit et al. 2002; Farmer and Braun 2002; Mcleod and 
Haygarth 2003); however, we lack data that would enable us to evaluate the role 
of the agricultural sector in that process.
Second, factors other than those pointed by CPR theory (see some of those 
mentioned above such as public awareness, market conditions, or changes in 
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technology) can explain cooperation and improved environmental outcomes. CPR 
theory does not say much about the relationship between cooperation and other 
sustainability factors. Although exploring that relationship was not the main goal 
of our case study, we provided some insights about it. Future research might look 
more systematically into the mediating and/or moderating role of sustainability 
factors in the relationship between cooperation and sustainability.
The lack of a clear understanding of the link between cooperation and other 
sustainability factors is connected to a broader issue of indiscriminate pluralism in 
CPR theory. The theory points to a good number of variables that can contribute to 
cooperation and sustainable management of local natural resources; however, the 
theory does not clearly differentiate how much and when those factors do make 
a difference (Agrawal 2001). In this study we aimed at coping with that issue 
through the combination of theory testing, within-case comparisons and process-
tracing. However, these techniques have limitations. The test of theoretical 
expectations can be particularly effective for falsifying theory but has limited 
ability to confirm support of a theory; the validity of within-case comparisons can 
be questioned by the lack of equivalent counterfactuals; and the use of process-
tracing risks confounding sequential occurrence with causality. We combined the 
three techniques to minimize those issues in a rather unsystematic way due to 
data availability constraints. Further efforts might be devoted to systematize the 
combination of those and other techniques.
As a final note, it is worth highlighting the contribution of this case study 
to the improvement of the SESMAD structure and content. First, the focus on 
pollution problems posed the challenge of representing and coding the relationship 
between multiple environmental commons (e.g. pollutants like cadmium and 
natural resources like salmon), as mediated or not by a governance system. A 
focus on overexploitation problems like in the case of fisheries or forest use 
might not necessarily have required such a development. Second, the focus on the 
watershed sector, pollution problems and the specific case of the Rhine inspired 
the inclusion of new variables such as upstream vs. downstream asymmetry and 
external disturbances, and the refinement of others, including the distinction of 
enforcement activities at different governance levels.
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